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THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION ON LAND DEVELOPMENT: 
A DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC ANALYSIS 
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal 
ABSTRACT 
In a two-period model, economists such as K.J. Arrow, A.C. Fisher, and C. Henry, have 
shown that when development is both indivisible and irreversible, a developer who ignores the 
possibility of obtaining new information about the outcome of such development will invariably 
underestimate the benefits of preservation and hence favor development. In this note, I extend the 
AFH analysis in two directions. I model the land development problem in a dynamic framework, 
explicitly specifying an information production function. In such a setting, I then ask and answer the 
question concerning when development should take place. 
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THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION ON LAND DEVELOPMENT: 
A DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
Since the seminal papers of Weisbrod (1964), Arrow and Fisher (1974), and Henry (1974), 
resource economists have been interested in the concept of option value. The so-called AFH concept 
of option value tells us that when development is both indivisible and irreversible, a developer who 
ignores the possibility of obtaining new information about the consequences of such development will 
invariably underestimate the benefits of preservation and hence skew the binary choice development 
decision in favor of development. 
This simple and yet powerful result has been shown to hold in its most general form in a 
two-period setting. However, the result typically does not hold in more general settings. It has 
already been shown by Epstein (1980) and Hanemann (1989) that when the development decision is 
divisible, this bias toward development need not arise; indeed, it will not arise unless the development 
benefit function is of a rather specific form. Similarly, one can ask about the nature of the 
development decision when this decision is made in an intertemporal setting. Because the AFH 
analysis is cortducted in a two-period model, the relevant development question is "Do I develop 
today or tomorrow?" In a dynamic setting, this question must be changed to "When do I develop?" 
This follows from the fact that the decision problem is not over two periods but over a much longer 
time horizon. A purpose of this note is to extend the AFH analysis and answer the "When do I 
develop?" question. 
As Hanemann (1989) has noted, the AFH option value is a conditional value of perfect 
information. In other words, it is the informational gain achieved when choosing the second period 
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development level, conditional on not having developed, i.e., preserved in the first period. Given this 
intimate connection between option value and the value of information, it would appear to be 
necessary to specify how information is generated in the development choice problem. However, this 
has typically not been done. As a result, Hanemann (1989, p. 36) has remarked that " ... the 
specification of the information production function is certainly an interesting area for further 
research." Given this, the second purpose of this note is to specify an information production 
function. 
I now follow Ross (1970, pp. 180-90; 1983, pp. 51-7) and discuss the optimal stopping 
framework which I shall use to analyze the "When do I develop?" question posed above. 
2. The Theoretical Framework 
I shall first describe the infinitesmallook ahead stopping rule (ILASR) and a theorem which 
provides conditions under which it is optimal to stop using ILASR. As Ross (1970, p. 188) has noted, 
the ILASR can be thought of as a policy which stops a stochastic process precisely in those states for 
which stopping immediately yields a higher payoff than waiting an additional time h. Let S be the set 
of states for which stopping immediately yields a higher payoff than waiting an additional time h. It 
can be shown that 
Theorem 1: (Ross, 1970, p. 188): If S is closed, i.e., once a stochastic process enters S, the process 
cannot exit S, then under certain regularity conditions, the ILASR is optimal. 
The land development problem can now be cast in an optimal stopping framework. This will 
enable me to use Theorem 1 to determine when development should take place. I proceed as in Ross 
(1970, pp. 189-90). The decision problem faced by a developer concerns when to develop a certain 
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parcel of land. Following AFH, I assume that this development decision is indivisible. The developer 
solves his problem in a dynamic and stochastic framework. The framework is stochastic because the 
decision to develop depends fundamentally on the availability of information regarding the 
consequences of development; this information is produced according to a nonhomogeneous Poisson 
process {I(t): t ~ O}, with a continuous, nonincreasing intensity function yet). Information is 
acquired independently, and this information has a common cumulative distribution function F( e), with 
finite mean. By allowing the information acquisition process to follow a nonhomogeneous Poisson 
process, I am leaving open the possibility that it is more likely that information will be received at 
certain times than at other times. Since the production of information is typically the result of R&D 
activities which generate results in an unpredictable manner, allowing for the above possibility would 
appear to be necessary. I make the natural assumption that any information that is not used 
immediately in deciding whether or not to develop, can be stored and used subsequently. The specific 
source of information production is not critical to my analysis. It could be the result of in-house R&D 
activities by the developer or it could be the result of research undertaken by other public or private 
agencies. In any event, from the perspective of the developer, information is costly to acquire; as 
such, in what follows, I will incorporate this cost in the overall decision problem faced by the 
developer. 
Upon acquiring information, the developer decides whether to develop his land or to preserve 
it and wait for additional information. Let f(e) be the continuous and strictly monotone function 
which maps information to revenue from development. That is, if i(t) is the information acquired by 
time t, thenf· f{i(t)} denotes the revenue from developing, given that a decision to develop has been 
made. Further, since f( e) is a continuous and strictly monotone transformation of I(t), Vt, it follows 
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that f is itself a nonhomogeneous Poisson process with a continuous and nonincreasing intensity 
function, say, e (t) (see Wolff, 1989, p. 26 for details). Further, the "revenues" are independent, with 
cumulative distribution function G(e). This distribution function also has a finite Jl!.ean. 
Should the developer choose not to develop his parcel of land, he incurs benefits and costs. 
The benefits are the obvious AFH type benefits; the developer preserves the flexibility to acquire new 
information in the future. The costs arise from the fact that the developer has to pay to obtain 
information, and he loses the revenue from development. I will denote the net benefit per unit of time 
from not developing (preserving) by p. 
The state of the process at any time is denoted by the pair [t, f { i ( t) } ], where t is the time, i 
is the highest quality information received by time 1, and f = f(i} is the revenue that would be received 
if the developer chooses to develop upon receiving i. Thus, it is clear that if the developer develops 
in state [t, f { i (t) }] , the developer's receipts from t onwards are f On the other hand, if the developer 
preserves his land and waits an additional time h, then his expected receipts are 
{ 
t+" } t+" 
1 - {e (r ) dr e f + {e (r ) dr e E[ max ( Y, .f)] + Bh + 0 (h ) , (1) 
where E[e] is;the expectation operator and Y is a random variable representing the development 
revenue from information acquired in [t, t + h]. Equation (1) can be simplified to 
f + J6(r)drJ(Y-.f)dG(y) + Bh + o(h) . 
f 
(2) 
Given (2), it follows that the developer should cease to preserve his land and develop it upon 
acquiring information i if and only if the revenue from developing now, i.e., at time t, exceeds the 
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expected revenue from postponing development by an additional time h. In other words, development 
should proceed now if and only if 
f+ f 6 (r) dr f(y-f)dG(y)+Bh +o(h) ~f· (3) 
/ 
Canceling the common terms on both sides of (3), dividing both sides of (3) by h and then letting h-+O 
yields 
6 (t) f (y - f) tKI (y) + B ~ 0 ( 4) 
/ 
as the condition for determining whether development should proceed immediately. From (4), I can 
define the set S, i.e., the set of all states for which stopping immediately (developing now) yields a 
higher payoff than waiting an incremental time h (developing later/preserving). This set is 
s - {(t. f): 6 (t) f (y - f)dG (y) ~ O} . (5) 
/ 
Note that S is closed because as t increases, 6(t) does not increase and the integral does not increase 
as well. I can now apply Theorem 1 and conclude that the developer should develop at time t if and 
only if the revenue from developing is f, where f - j(i). and f solves 
6 (t) f {y - f} tKI (y) - 0 . ( 6) 
/ 
In other words, development should take place at t, if, probabilistically speaking, it does not pay to 
wait and leam for an additional period of time. 
3. Conclusions 
In this note I modeled the land development question in a dynamic and stochastic framework. 
In this setting, I provided an answer to the "When do I develop?" question. This answer involved 
a comparison of the returns obtainable from developing at time t, i.e., f{i(t)}, with the expected 
returns to be obtained by preserving and waiting for new information beyond time t. 
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The analysis of this note can be generalized in a number of directions. I suggest two possible 
extensions. First, one could consider the divisible development question in a context similar to that 
of this note. This extension will enable one to determine whether the possibility of acquiring new 
information (learning) true1y skews the development decision in favor of increased preservation in the 
most general case. Second, one could consider alternate specifications of the information production 
function. In this note, I have provided a simple specification for the information production function 
in which information is produced in accordance with a nonhomogeneous Poisson process. More 
general specifications will permit more elaborate analyses of the connections between information 
production and land development. 
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